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The Medium-Term Impact of Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical Prices
Abstract
Medicare Part D began coverage of prescription drugs in 2006. Using data from the first year of the
program we found that Part D reduced pharmaceutical prices for Medicare recipients, with these effects
driven by enrollees previously without drug coverage. In this paper we extend our analysis through 2009,
the fourth year of the program, to investigate whether plans continued to extract price concessions in
return for favorable formulary placement, or if consumer inertia or other factors caused prices to bounce
back after their initial decline. We find price declines persisted through at least the third year of the
program.

Disciplines
Health and Medical Administration | Insurance

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/77

American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2011, 101:3, 387–392
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.3.387

The Medium-Term Impact of Medicare Part D
on Pharmaceutical Prices
By Mark G. Duggan and Fiona Scott Morton*
Part D represents the largest expansion of
Medicare since the program’s inception in 1965.
Though initially projected to cost the federal
government $780 billion over its first ten years
(2006–2015), it has been running substantially
under budget. This is due primarily to three factors. The first is that fewer new branded drugs
have been invented and launched in the United
States, with the result that an increasing fraction of drugs consumed by the elderly are now
available in inexpensive generic forms. Second,
enrollees have tended to choose less generous plans than was forecasted by government
actuaries. Thirdly, Part D is set up so that the
government does not directly purchase drugs,
but rather subsidizes participating private prescription drug plans (PDPs), which then negotiate with pharmaceutical companies over drug
prices. The evidence provided in our previous
work suggests that plans have been successful in
negotiating lower prices for branded drugs and
that this has also helped to contain the cost of the
program (Duggan and Scott Morton 2010). In
this paper we explore whether these price reductions persisted in the second, third, and fourth
years of the program.
The pharmaceutical sales data that we use in
this paper indicate that real retail pharmaceutical
sales have been growing more slowly in recent
years—by just 1.6 percent per year from 2006
to 2009 versus 6.3 percent per year from 2001

through 2006.1 This is a significant change,
and it may be that Part D is helping to slow
that growth, given Medicare recipients account
for more than 40 percent of pharmaceutical
spending. However, during this same three-year
period, the average monthly premiums paid by
Medicare recipients for Part D coverage rose
by 8.3 percent annually, suggesting that the
price reductions achieved in the first year of the
program may not have persisted in subsequent
years.
In our prior work, we showed that the institutions and mechanisms used by Part D plans
strongly affect market outcomes. By institutions, we have in mind large buyer groups,
structured incentives for patients to consume
certain products, and the development and use
of formularies. A formulary is a mechanism
that allows a buyer to identify a therapeutically
similar treatment as a viable substitute for a patented treatment, and then create price competition due to the ability to substitute away from
the more expensive product. When bargaining
with the seller of a patented product, the ability
to shift demand to a substitute drug is a powerful
negotiating tool.
Our previous research suggests that moving
consumers from cash-paying status to membership in a Part D plan lowers optimal prices for
branded prescription drugs below what they otherwise would be. This is to some extent surprising because the standard effect of insurance is
to create inelastic demand and therefore elicit
higher prices from a seller with market power
(Duggan and Scott Morton 2006). Furthermore,
our estimates reveal the effect is driven by the
consumption of drugs by Medicare recipients
without insurance before Part D. It appears to be
the movement of Medicare recipients from cashpaying uninsured status to insured under a plan
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1
Sales, price, and Part D premium data in all years are
adjusted to 2009 dollars using the CPI-U. The June 2010
CPI-U is used to adjust dollar values in both 2010 and 2011.
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that causes the decline in per unit prices. The
most plausible mechanism driving this result is
not the insurance per se, but the activities of the
insurer. The insurers that we study bundle insurance with a formulary and other mechanisms to
create elastic demand.
It is clearly important for policy decisions to
determine if the effect on prices was temporary,
or if society can continue to expect low prices in
Part D due to the ongoing market pressure that
plans place on branded pharmaceutical manufacturers. We explore this issue in the current paper.
Our estimation strategy remains the same as in
our previous work: we exploit variation across
branded drugs in their prepolicy Medicare market shares to estimate the effects of Part D on
pharmaceutical prices.
I. Regulatory Environment and Theory2

Competition in Part D takes place fundamentally at the level of the consumer. A Medicare
recipient may choose to enroll in any plan
offered in her region of the country. When making this choice, the recipient would consider the
plan’s monthly premium, the drugs included
on the formulary, the prices of those drugs, and
any other feature of the plan she values such as
brand name or service quality. The plan bargains with drug manufacturers over the prices at
which it will purchase drugs on behalf of beneficiaries, who then face out-of-pocket costs for
those drugs as described in the plan rules. These
price negotiations take place with manufacturers
of branded treatments, who have market power
due to their intellectual property (patent on the
molecule).
To fix ideas, suppose that all Medicare enrollees have no drug coverage prior to Part D and
must pay cash for their prescription drugs, but
then enroll in Part D when it begins. Notice
that when this group paid cash for prescription drugs, its members were not able to create
effective price competition between molecules
by threatening to switch to a therapeutic substitute. However, once in Part D, these consumers
were represented by a PDP. The result of the
change in institutional structure is an increase in
the cross-price elasticity of substitution for this

group. For a number of common models of consumer demand, as the elasticity of substitution
rises and other factors remain constant, the optimal price for the product falls. A second effect
comes from the fact that the group is now subsidized at 75 percent of the cost of the drug in
the main coverage region and 95 percent in the
catastrophic region. Sensitivity to price falls and
this causes the optimal price to increase. Our
earlier results demonstrate that the first effect
dominated in 2006, the first year of the program.
While the regulations concerning the operation of Part D have not changed substantially
since the start of the program (with respect to
drug pricing and negotiation), one can imagine a
number of reasons why pharmaceutical prices in
Part D may have been unusually low in the first
year. It may be that manufacturers initially set
low prices to get preferable placement on formularies, but as buyers became less price sensitive they raised prices. The fact that average
Medicare Part D premiums3 have gone up rapidly suggests that something like this may have
occurred. The average annual increase from
2006 to 2010 was 7.5 percent, with an especially
large increase of 17.8 percent from 2008 to 2009
(Jack Hoadley et al. 2010). It therefore seems
plausible that the price reductions obtained in
the first year of the program may not have persisted in subsequent years.
On the other hand, if we think of the buyers
of the branded drugs as the Part D plans rather
than the ultimate consumers, it is not clear that
buyers would become less price-sensitive over
time. If consumers have developed switching
costs across plans, this would give plans market
power, but would not give the plan any reason to
bargain less aggressively with the manufacturer.
Consistent with this hypothesis is a recent study
by the Kaiser Family Foundation that shows
considerable variation across (popular) plans
in the formulary placement of top brand-name
drugs (Elizabeth Hargrave et al. 2010). Many
drugs are preferred by a majority of plans, but
are not on the formulary at all in other plans.
Other drugs are preferred in only a minority of
plans and have poor formulary placement in
the others. These patterns suggest plans may
3

2
See Duggan, Patrick Healy, and Scott Morton (2008)
for a detailed description of Part D.

MAY 2011

These premiums cover just 25.5 percent of the cost of
standard Part D coverage, with the federal government subsidizing the rest. On the margin, however, consumers face
the full cost of choosing more generous plans.
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be obtaining price concessions in exchange for
formulary placement. As there are theoretical
reasons for prices to move in either direction,
we provide analysis below to shed light on the
question.
II. Pharmaceutical Sales Data and Constructing
the Analysis Sample

We use data from 2005 to 2009 from IMS
Health on total revenues and standardized units
of each product (excluding sales to hospitals and
long-term care facilities) in the United States for
all pharmaceutical products in each year. This
allows us to calculate the average price per day
in each year for each product. When calculating
average prices, we aggregate sales and quantities for all versions of the same drug in the year.
Because our data run through 2009, we can estimate the effect of Part D in its first four years.
We merge this IMS data on annual, productspecific average prices to data from the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which is an
annual dataset constructed by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) that
includes detailed information on health care
utilization for a representative sample of the
noninstitutionalized US population. Using the
MEPS data, for each drug we calculate the fraction of all prescriptions sold to Medicare recipients in 2002 and 2003, the two years just prior to
the passage of the Medicare Modernization Act
in December 2003. Approximately 40 percent
of all prescriptions are dispensed to Medicare
recipients in our two base years but the variation across drugs in this Medicare market share
(MMS) is substantial.
Following our previous research on the
impact of Medicare Part D (Duggan and Scott
Morton 2010), we focus on the top 1,000 drugs
in terms of total 2003 revenues. These treatments account for more than 97 percent of all
pharmaceutical sales in 2003, with this fraction
declining over time, to 87 percent in 2006 and
75 percent by 2009. This decline occurs because
the sample excludes drugs that had not yet been
introduced in 2003, and drugs with low initial
sales that have high sales later in our study
period. We then exclude drugs from the top
1,000 that are generic, sold over the counter, or
that do not appear in the 2002 or 2003 MEPS
prescribed medicines file. This leaves us with a
sample of 545 drugs that have strictly positive
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sales in 2006. These 545 drugs account for 77
percent of total 2003 pharmaceutical sales, with
this share also declining over time to 66 percent
in 2006 and 55 percent by 2009.
One limitation of our focus on these topselling drugs from 2003 is that we will fail to
capture any effects of Part D on relatively new
products or products with low sales in 2003.
III. Identification Strategy and Empirical Results

Merging average prices with information
from the MEPS on product-specific Medicare
market shares, we estimate specifications of the
following type:
(1)

Δlog(Pj,t) = α1 + β1 MMSj,2003
+ μ1Yrsj,2003

+ δ1AnyGenericj,2006

+ ε1 j,t ,

with j indexing drugs and Δlog(Pj,t) equal to
the change in the log of the average price for
drug j from 2005 to year t.4 In addition to the
Medicare market share, this specification controls for the presence of generic competition and
for the number of years since the product was
approved by the FDA, though our key estimates
are not sensitive to the inclusion of these two
variables. The coefficient estimate of particular
interest is β1, which captures the average effect
of Medicare Part D on pharmaceutical prices.
Our key identifying assumption is that there
are no unobserved factors correlated with the
Medicare market share that also affect pharmaceutical price changes in our time period. By
taking first differences of average prices, we
remove any unobserved time-invariant differences across drugs. We further assume that any
effects of Medicare Part D on average prices are
4
Our earlier paper used one set of data sent to us by IMS
for the 2001 through 2006 period. In this paper, we use a second set of data sent to us by IMS for the 2005 through 2009
period. During the three-year period between our receipt of
the first and second sets of data, IMS made some changes to
the data. Rather than using two different datasets with slight
inconsistencies, we use this one dataset that was similarly
constructed across all years considered. Thus, our base year
is 2005 instead of 2003 as in our earlier paper.
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Table 1—The Impact of Medicare Part D on Changes in Pharmaceutical Prices

Medicare market sharej,2003
Observations

2005–2006
(1)

2005–2007
(2)

2005–2008
(3)

2005–2009
(4)

545

545

537

529

−0.104**
(0.045)

−0.258***
(0.081)

−0.180
(0.132)

−0.010
(0.163)

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

driven by changes in the prices sold to Medicare
recipients rather than prices in other segments of
the market.5 To the extent that Part D plans succeeded in negotiating lower prices, the estimate
for β1 would be negative.
It is worth emphasizing that our measure of
Medicare market share represents the share of
prescriptions sold to Medicare recipients before
the start of Part D. Not all Medicare recipients
are enrolled in Part D, and thus MMSj,2003 may
be more appropriately thought of as potential Part D enrollment. Enrollment in Part D
increased during our study period, from 22.6
million in August 2006 to 27.0 million three
years later, with this latter enrollment representing approximately 60 percent of all Medicare
recipients. All else equal, this growth in Part D
enrollment would potentially lead to an increasing effect of MMSj,2003 over time.
Columns 1 through 4 of Table 1 display the
coefficient on MMS in specifications for the four
(average log) price changes from the base year to
2006 to 2009. Consistent with our past work, we
find a significantly negative effect of Medicare
Part D in the first year of the program, as summarized in column 2. More specifically, the estimate
of −0.104 for β1, which is significant at the 5
percent level, suggests that Medicare recipients
experienced price reductions of approximately
10 percent in the first year of the program relative
to what they otherwise would have paid. The corresponding coefficient estimate from our earlier
paper was almost identical.
In the second column we report the results
from specifications with the two-year price
change from 2005 to 2007. The estimate of
5

Recent research by Darius Lakdawalla and Wesley Yin
(2010) suggests that Part D increased the negotiating power
of health insurers and allowed them to also negotiate lower
prices for their non-Medicare recipients.

−0.258 is more than twice as large as the oneyear price change and is significant at the 1 percent level. This result provides evidence that
there were additional price reductions obtained
by Medicare Part D plans in the second year
of the program, and that these were similar in
magnitude to the declines in year one. In an
analogous specification not reported here of the
one-year price change from 2006 to 2007, the
estimate for β1 is −0.155, which is significant at
the 1 percent level.
In column 3 we show that the estimate for
β1 in the specification of the three-year price
change from 2005 to 2008 remains negative at
−0.180. However, this estimate is not statistically significant. But the somewhat smaller
magnitude of this point estimate suggests that
there were no further reductions in prices in the
third year of the program. In the fourth and final
specification, the point estimate for β1 increases
and is close to zero at just −0.010. However,
given a standard error of 0.163, our estimates
are compatible with a wide range of effects by
the fourth year of the program. Additionally, the
share of all pharmaceutical sales accounted for
by our sample is quite low by this final year.
As in our previous paper, we next distinguish
between Medicare recipients who already had
drug coverage prior to Part D and their counterparts on Medicare who were without this
insurance by estimating specifications of the
following type:
(2)

Δlog(Pj,t) = α + β1MMS_Self j,2003
+ β2MMS_Insj,2003
+ μYrsj,2003

+ δ1AnyGenericj,2006 + εj,t.
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Table 2—Differentiating between Medicare Recipients
with and without RX Insurance

Medicare self-pay sharej,2003
Medicare insured sharej,2003
Observations

2005–2006
(1)

2005–2007
(2)

2005–2008
(3)

2005–2009
(4)

545

545

537

529

−0.144***
(0.046)
−0.015
(0.097)

−0.278***
(0.075)
−0.215
(0.225)

−0.372**
(0.179)
0.237
(0.233)

−0.185
(0.202)
0.371
(0.281)

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

In this regression, MMS_Selfj,2003 is the share of
prescriptions dispensed to Medicare recipients
who were without drug coverage in 2003, and
MMS_Insj,2003 is the share dispensed to beneficiaries with some drug coverage (thus, the two
sum to MMSj,2003). Our earlier results demonstrated that the price reductions were driven by
this latter group.
Consistent with this, the first column of
Table 2 shows that the estimated effect for
“uninsured” Medicare recipients in the 2005 to
2006 price change specification is significantly
negative, while the corresponding estimate for
their insured counterparts is much smaller in
magnitude and statistically insignificant. This
pattern persists in the subsequent specifications,
with the estimate being twice as large through
2007 and even greater through 2008, though the
precision of the estimates declines as in Table 1.
In all four cases, the estimate for β1 is negative,
and in three cases it is statistically significant.
In contrast, the estimate for β2 is positive in two
specifications and negative in two specifications,
and is not significant in any of them.6
These results suggest that the substantial price
reductions for the uninsured that we estimated
in the first year of Medicare Part D were even
larger in the second and third years of the program. However, the smaller negative coefficient
that we estimate in year four suggests simply
that the initial price reduction we estimated in
2006 has persisted to 2009.

6
In the specification in which β1 is not significant, the
p-value on the difference between β1 and β2 is 0.109.

IV. Conclusions

Our findings in this paper indicate that the
Part D plans succeeded in negotiating substantially lower prices for Medicare recipients
through the first four years of the program. We
estimate additional price declines in years two
and three that appear to have been reversed in
year four (2009), though we note that the precision of our results declines over time and thus
we put less weight on these later estimates.
Our results indicate that the increase in Part D
premiums during our study period is not driven
by existing brands. One possible explanation is
that newly released brands—brands that are not in
our sample—are driving up the cost of Part D and
leading to higher premiums. A second explanation is that in later years of the program consumers have a cost of switching plans and become
less price-sensitive to premiums, and therefore
plans have market power. If this explanation were
the case, then premiums would be rising due to
the market power of Part D plans, not the market
power of pharmaceutical manufacturers. A third
potential explanation is that Medicare recipients
are gravitating toward more generous plans over
time. Given the growing importance of Medicare
Part D due to the aging of the baby boom generation and the changes in Part D resulting from
the recent health reform legislation, more work in
this area is clearly warranted.
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